The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the Originalists by Dodge, William S.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 19
Number 2 Winter 1996 Article 1
1-1-1996
The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the Originalists
William S. Dodge
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the Originalists, 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
221 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol19/iss2/1
The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort
Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists"
By WILLIAM S. DODGE: :
I. Introduction
The Alien Tort Statute1 is one of the most widely discussed provi-
sions in modem international law.2 Since the Second Circuit's
* Assistant Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the La,, BA.,
Yale College, 1986; J.D., Yale Law School, 1991. I would like to thank David B1eJerman
and Stefan Riesenfeld for commenting on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to Pat
Sweeney, who graciously discussed the subject of this Article uith me on SeQ oral c-asions.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.").
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over Inter-
national Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala,2-
HARv. INT'L LJ. 53 (1981); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statt:e and tfe Judt cir
Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (19S9); William R, Casto, The
Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law, of
Nations, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 467 (19S6); David Cole, Jules Lobel & Harold Honju Koh,
Interpreting the Alien Tort Statue: Amicus Curiae Memorandun of Internattonal Lawv
Scholars and Practitioners in Trajano v. Marcos, 12 H-RxsTiNCS IT'L & Ccr.ip. L. RE%,. 1
(1988); Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Consttttton, 2
ANIL J. INrL L. 62 (198); Anthony D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the Lawv of Natnons
is Seriously Mistaken, 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 92 (19S5) [hereinafter D'Amato, Judge Bork];
Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 17S9: Lessons from In re
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST. Jon's L. RPv. 491 (1993); Harold Honfju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ. 2347 (1991); Harold Hon ju Koh, Civd
Remedies For Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transnational Paibli La',
Litigation, 22 Tax. INT'L LJ. 169 (1987); Richard B. Lillich, Itvoking Internattonal Human
Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 367 (19S5); Kenneth C. Randall, Fd.
eral Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Staltte, 1
N.Y.U. J. IN-Lr'L L. & Pot 1 (1985) [hereinafter Randall, FederalJurisdiction Over Interna-
tional Law Claims]; Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Stature and a
Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. I1r'L. L. & PoLt 473 (19S6); John NI. Rogers, The Alicn Tort
Statute and How Individuals "iolate" International Lamv, 21 VAND. J. "P 'er'L L. 47
(1988); Alfred P. Rubin, Professor D'Amato's Concept of American Jurisdiction is Seri.
ously Mistaken, 79 Am J. INT'L L. 105 (1985); Jean-Marie Simon, The Alen Tort Claims
Ac.' Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U. INr'L LJ. 1 (1993); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the
Promise of Flartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, 20 YALE J. IL'r'L L. 65 (1995); Beth Stephes, The Civil Lawsuit as a Remedy for
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landmark decision in Filartiga v. Pefia-lrala,3 federal courts have de-
veloped a sophisticated jurisprudence for international human rights
cases brought under the Statute.4 Yet the Statute's historical origins
are murky. Judge Friendly once remarked that it is a "legal Lohen-
grin; . . . no one seems to know whence it came."'5 We know, of
course, that the Alien Tort Statute was enacted as the Alien Tort
ClauseO-a provision in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, drafted
by Oliver Ellsworth.7 Because the Clause lacks a "legislative history,"
however, it is difficult to establish definitively what Ellsworth and the
First Congress meant to accomplish with the provision.
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit held that the Alien Tort Statute
provides federal jurisdiction over acts of torture that occur abroad be-
cause torture today violates the law of nations." Even if the First Con-
gress did not have torture in mind when it passed the Alien Tort
Clause, Filartiga said, "courts must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among nations of the
world today." 9 Moreover, Filartiga and its progeny have held that the
International Human Rights Violations Against Women, 5 HASTINGS WVOMEN'S L.J. 143
(1994); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HAs.
TINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 445 (1995); Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protec-
tive Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 933 (1982).
3. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (llth Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karad'id, 70
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2960 (1993); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), ccrt.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v.
Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.
Cal. 1987). I should disclose that I participated on behalf of plaintiffs in the briefing of
Paul v. Avril when I was a law student.
5. IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
6. See Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The current version of the
provision is most commonly called the "Alien Tort Statute." See, e.g., Argentine Republic
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,432 (1989); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. But
it has also been called the "Alien Tort Claims Act," see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 367, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1991) [hereinafter HoUSE REPoRT], reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84,86
(1992); Benjamins v. Brit. Eur. Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1114 (1979), and simply the "Alien Tort Act," see, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236. I will
bow to convention and refer to the current version as the "Alien Tort Statute," but will
refer to the provision passed by the First Congress as the "Alien Tort Clause" because I
believe it more accurately describes what that provision is-a clause in Section 9 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.
7. Ellsworth is generally credited with drafting much of the First Judiciary Act, in-
cluding Section 9. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 HAgv. L. REv. 49, 50 (1923).
8. 630 F.2d at 878.
9. Id. at 881.
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Alien Tort Clause "open[s] the federal courts for adjudication of the
rights ... recognized by international law" without the need for fur-
ther legislation.' 0
Against this prevailing view, Judge Bork has raised the "original-
ist" banner in an effort to exclude modem human rights suits from the
scope of the provision." In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork made two related
arguments. First, he argued that for human rights plaintiffs to bring
their claims in federal court they need not just a grant of jurisdiction,
which the Alien Tort Clause provides, but also an express cause of
action.'" Recognizing that this requirement would have rendered the
Clause a nullity the moment it was passed however, Judge Bork ad-
vanced a second argument-that the Clause was meant to apply only
to torts that violated the law of nations in 1789, such as piracy and
torts against ambassadors, and that it should be limited to those torts
exclusively.' 3 In other words, Judge Bork argued that, to carry out the
original intent of the Clause, the "law of nations" to which it refers
must be frozen in 1789. This would specifically exclude contemporary
human rights suits, since "in 1789 there was no concept of interna-
tional human rights." 4
Recently, Professor Sweeney has raised an intriguing new argu-
ment to support the "originalist" cause."5 Based on a prodigious
amount of historical research on the eighteenth century law governing
the capture of enemy vessels at sea known as prize law, Professor
Sweeney concludes that the Alien Tort Clause was designed exclu-
sively to provide jurisdiction over a subcategory of prize cases-suits
for torts committed during a capture in which the vessel's status as a
"prize" was not at issue; in short, suits for a tort only.16 Like Judge
10. Id at 887; see also Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F-3d 844,847 (11th Cir. 1936); Kadie,
70 F3d at 236; Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 934 (1995); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 86 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass, 1995); Paul v.
Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207,212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez.Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,1539
(N.D. Cal. 1987).
11. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 79sS2- 3 (D.C. Cir. 1934)
(Bork, ., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
12. Id at 801-08.
13. Id. at 810-16.
14. Id. at 813.
15. See Sweeney, supra note 2.
16. Id. at 481-83. Professor Sweeney's reading has the virtue of explaining why Ells-
worth put the word "only" in the text of the Clause. See id. at 478-3. For a different
explanation, see infra notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
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Bork's "originalist" arguments, Professor Sweeney's reading of the
Clause would exclude contemporary human rights suits.17
The "originalist" arguments raised by Judge Bork and Professor
Sweeney cast doubt on the correctness of the Filartiga line of cases.
There are two ways to respond to such arguments. The first is to
avoid the question by arguing that, even if Filartiga misinterpreted the
Alien Tort Clause in 1980, Congress has subsequently ratified and
even expanded that interpretation.' s The second is to meet Judge
Bork and Professor Sweeney on their own terms and show that their
arguments are not truly "originalist" at all.
The thesis of this Article is that Filartiga is more consistent with
the original understanding of the Alien Tort Clause than the interpre-
tations advanced by Judge Bork and Professor Sweeney. I argue that
the original understanding of the Alien Tort Clause is reflected in its
text-"[t]hat the district courts shall have ... cognizance ... of all
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States"'g-not just those for which
there is an express cause of action; not just those that violated the law
of nations in 1789; and not just those that arose in the context of a
capture at sea. In Part II, I review the historical evidence of the
Clause's origin and argue that the Clause was designed to ensure that
those who violated the law of nations could be held liable not just
criminally but civilly as well.20 I also explain how the Clause was in-
tended to operate within the framework of the common law and the
federal system.2'
17. See Sweeney, supra note 2, at 483 ("I do not know of any case in which the clause
has been properly applied by a court."). The defendant in Kadic v. Karadzie relied unsuc-
cessfully on Professor Sweeney's article in his petition for rehearing. 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir.
1996) (denying petition for rehearing).
18. In 1992, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992), which extends section 1350's remedy to U.S. citizens and provides an ex-
press cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing. Id. § 2(a). The House Report
makes clear that the Act is intended to supplement the Alien Tort Statute, not supersede it.
See HousE REPoRT, supra note 6, at 3-4, reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (1992)
("[C]laims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that
may appropriately be covered [by] section 1350. That statute should remain intact to per-
mit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of
customary international law.").
19. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (emphasis added). For the cur-
rent text of the provision, see supra note 1. I agree with Professor Sweeney that subse-
quent stylistic changes have not altered the district courts' jurisdiction. Sweeney, supra
note 2, at 449-50.
20. See infra notes 26-74 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 75-110 and accompanying text.
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Part MI responds to each of the arguments raised by the
"originalists": (1) that an express cause of action is needed, which the
Clause does not provide; (2) that the Clause should be limited to those
torts that violated the law of nations in 1789; and (3) that the Clause
should be limited to prize cases. I argue that the first argument is
patently antihistorical,22 and that the second is contrary to the Found-
ing Generation's understanding that the law of nations would
evolve. 3 Finally, I contend that the third argument is too selective in
its use of history, is contrary to the language of the Alien Tort Clause,
would render the Clause largely redundant, and is contradicted by the
earliest interpretations of the Clause. 4 In short, Judge Bork's inter-
pretation of the Alien Tort Clause is actually antihistorical, while Pro-
fessor Sweeney's interpretation is only deceptively historical. It is
Filartiga's interpretation that deserves the mantle of originalism.
H. The Historical Origins of the Clause
As originally enacted, the Alien Tort Clause provided: "'That the
district courts shall have... cognizance, concurrent with the courts of
the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."25 But what was the "law of
nations" to which the Clause referred? How was it possible for an
individual to violate that law by committing a "tort"? XThere did the
notion of federal jurisdiction over such torts come from? And how
would the Clause operate within the framework of the common law
and the federal system?
A. Blackstone and the "Law of Nations"
In the fourth volume of his Commentaries, Blackstone has a chap-
ter on "Offences against the Law of Nations."", Guided by Black-
stone,27 the Founding Generation viewed the law of nations as resting
on natural law. 8 He explained that "[t]he law of nations is a system
22. See infra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 152-219 and accompanying text.
25. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (17S9).
26. 4 WVnIAm BLAc1y'oNB, CoMhMENTARIEs *66-73.
27. For a comprehensive discussion of Blackstone's influence on the Founding G~nar-
ation, see Dennis R Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and dte New American Republic: A
Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 731 (1976).
28. Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Lawv, 42 VvAm. L.
REv. 819, 822 (1989).
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of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by universal
consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world. ' 29 Thus, as Jus-
tice Story would later put it, "every doctrine, that may be fairly de-
duced by correct reasoning from the rights and duties of nations, and
the nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in the
law of nations. '30 According to Blackstone, "[t]he principal offences
against the law of nations... are of three kinds; 1. Violation of safe-
conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and, 3.
Piracy. 3 1
Blackstone had no doubt that individuals could violate the law of
nations. Indeed, each of the "principal offences" he discussed would
typically have been committed by individuals. 32 He explained that
"where the individuals of any state violate this general law [of na-
tions], it is then the interest as well as duty of the government under
which they live, to animadvert upon them with a becoming severity,
that the peace of the world may be maintained. '3 3 In England, this
"animadversion" was accomplished mainly by criminal sanctions,
which Blackstone discusses at length.34 However, the concept of hold-
ing violators civilly liable was also known in England, for he mentions
that, by statute, restitution against the transgressor was available for
violation of a safe-conduct.35
B. The Continental Congress' Resolution of 1781
In the United States, the Continental Congress became con-
cerned with how to redress individual violations of the law of nations
as early as 1781.36 Congress lacked authority to punish such violations
itself,37 So it passed a resolution recommending to the States that they
"provide expeditious, exemplary and adequate punishment" for viola-
29. 4 BLAcKcS'roN, supra note 26, at *66; see also 4 id. at *66-67 ("such rules must
necessarily result from those principles of natural justice, in which all the learned of every
nation agree").
30. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No.
15,551), overruled on other grounds, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
31. 4 Br CKSoNE, supra note 26, at *68.
32. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
33. 4 Bt.AcKwSoNE, supra note 26, at *68.
34. See 4 id at *68-73.
35. See 4 id. at *69 ("the injured stranger should have restitution out of [the violator's]
effects"); 4 id. at *70 ("the lord chancellor... may cause full restitution and amends to be
made to the party injured").
36. See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINNrAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 1136-37 (Library
of Congress, 1912).
37. Casto, supra note 2, at 490.
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tions of the law of nations and treaties to which the United States was
a party.3 Specifically, the States were asked to punish: (1) violations
of express safe-conducts "granted under the authority of Congress to
subjects of a foreign power in time of war"; (2) "acts of hostility
against such as are in amity, league or truce with the United States or
who are within the same, under a general implied safe conduct"; (3)
"infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and other public minis-
ters"; and (4) "infractions of treaties and conventions to which the
United States are a party. '39 The first three categories parallel Black-
stone's discussion so closely that there can be little doubt of their ori-
gin 40 Congress added infractions of treaties to Blackstone's list but
omitted piracy, presumably because Congress itself had authority to
appoint courts for the trial of piracies.4' Congress did not intend its
list to be exhaustive42 and it further recommended that the States
"erect a tribunal in each State, or... vest one already existing with
power to decide on offences against the law of nations, not contained
in the foregoing enumeration. 4 3
But the resolution did not stop there. The Continental Congress
further recommended to the States "to authorise suits to be instituted
for damages by the party injured, and for compensation to the United
States for damage sustained by them from an injury done to a foreign
power by a citizen."' The resolution thus described two types of civil
suits in state court: (1) tort suits brought by the injured party against
the tortfeasor, and (2) suits brought by the United States against the
tortfeasor to reimburse the United States for compensation paid to
the injured party.
The first type of suit envisioned civil liability extending to the full
range of law-of-nations violations, not just to the violations of safe-
conducts for which English law provided reparations.4 s As Professor
38. 21 JOURNALS OF TE CoNViNENrAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 36, at 1136.
For the full text of the 1781 resolution, see infra Appendix.
39. 21 JOUNALS OF TIM CoW'rNTrrrAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 36. at 1136
37.
40. See 4 BLAcasTOrE, supra note 26, at *6S-71.
41. See AR'CrTLs OF CONFEDERAMON, art. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 4,6 FThe United States, in
Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of ... appointing
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas ..... }
42. The resolution called these four categories "only those offenCes against the law of
nations which are most obvious." 21 JoURNALs OF THE Co-n'r TAL CoNrGEss 1774-
1789, supra note 36, at 1137.
43. Id
44. Id
45. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Slaughter has noted, civil liability "was an entirely logical addition" to
criminal sanctions." There were two ways to redress offenses against
the law of nations: punishing the wrongdoer and making the injured
party whole.47 Criminal sanctions were directed at the former; civil
damages at the latter. This recommendation for civil suits by the in-
jured party was "the direct precursor of the alien tort provision in the
First Judiciary Act. ' s
The second type of suit envisioned by the 1781 resolution was
designed more narrowly to allow reimbursement of the United States
in those instances where it had decided to pay the damages itself in
order to resolve an international incident quickly.49 Because the
United States would only be motivated to pay the damages directly
when the injury was done by one of its citizens, the resolution referred
to injuries done "by a citizen." The syntax of the resolution makes
clear that this requirement applied only to the second type of suit. 0
It is not certain how many of the States acted on the 1781 resolu-
tion. The following year, Connecticut passed "An Act to prevent In-
fractions of the Laws of Nations," which criminalized specific
violations of the law of nations as well as "any other Infractions or
Violations of or Offenses against the known received and established
46. Burley, supra note 2, at 477.
47. The principle of punishing the wrongdoer and making the victim whole has stood
the test of time. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535
(1985), not only obligates each state party to prosecute or extradite those who engage in
torture, see id. arts. 4-7, but also to "ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of
torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation."
Id. art. 14.
48. Burley, supra note 2, at 477; see also Casto, supra note 2, at 490-91; Rosenberg,
supra note 2, at 1017.
49. The committee report preceding the resolution explained:
That as instances may occur, in which, for the avoidance of war, it may be expedi-
ent to repair out of the public treasury injuries committed by individuals, and the
property of the innocent be exposed to reprisal, the author of those injuries
should compensate the damage out of his private fortune.
21 JOUmAUs OF TIM CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 36, at 1136.
50. Casto, supra note 2, at 499 n.179. The distinction between these two types of civil
suits is important to rebut any argument that the Alien Tort Clause requires the defendant
to be a U.S. citizen. Even if the "by a citizen" language in the 1781 resolution is read to
apply to both kinds of suits, the Marbois affair three years later, in which the assailant was
an alien, would have made such a limitation seem inadvisable. See infra notes 55-64 and
accompanying text. And, of course, no such limitation was included in the text of the
Alien Tort Clause.
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Laws of Civilized Nations."-" The Connecticut act also provided a
broad tort remedy for injuries "to any foreign Power or to the Sub-
jects thereof" without regard to whether the tort involved a violation
of the law of nations. On the other hand, Edmund Randolph, writ-
ing in 1787, complained that "[i]f we examine the constitutions, and
laws of the several states, it is immediately discovered, that the law of
nations is unprovided with sanctions in many cases, which deeply af-
fect public dignity and public justice,"53 which leads one to think that
many States did not follow Connecticut's example. 4
C. The Marbois Affair
Regardless of how many States acted on the 1781 resolution, an
assault on the French Consul General in Philadelphia in 1784 must
have added a sense of urgency to the issue. 5 On May 17, 1784, a
French citizen known as the Chevalier De Longchamps threatened
Francis Barbe Marbois, the French Consul General, in the French
Ambassador's home.5 6 Two days later, De Longchamps assaulted
Marbois on the streets of Philadelphia.? The case attracted wide con-
cern.58 The Continental Congress offered a reward so that De
Longchamps "may be brought to justice for his said violation of the
laws of Nations and of the land"5 9 and, upon being informed of his
arrest, Congress "highly approve[d]" Pennsylvania's actions. ' But
there was little else that the national government could do. As it was
forced to explain to Marbois the following year, its powers were lim-
ited by "the nature of a federal union in which each State retains a
distinct and absolute sovereignty in all matters not expressly delegated
51. William R. Casto, Correspondence, 83 Am. L WLrr L. 901, 903 (1989) (quoting 4
THs PUBLIc RcoRDs OFT IE STATE OF CONNECTICUT FOR THE YEAR 1783, at 156-57 (L.
Labaree ed., 1942)).
52. See id.
53. A Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esquire, on the Federal Constitu-
tion (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 Tim CosNi,.Er Arm--FED usr S6, 83 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981).
54. See also infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
55. See Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims, supra note 2, at
24-26; Casto, supra note 2, at 491-94.
56. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalU.) 111 (1784).
57. Id.
58. Professor Casto has found frequent discussion of the Marbois affair in the letters
of prominent statesmen. Casto, supra note 2, at 492 n.143.
59. 27 JouRNum&s OF THE Cowa;ETAL. CONGESxS 1774-1789, supra note 36, at 478-
79.
60. 27 id. at 503.
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to Congress leaving to them only that of advising in many of those
cases in which other governments decree." 61
Ultimately, De Longchamps was tried and convicted by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court for a crime against the law of nations, which
the court held to be part of Pennsylvania's common law.62 In the
wake of the Marbois affair, the Continental Congress recommended
that the States "pass laws for the exemplary punishment of such per-
sons as may in future by violence or by insult attack the dignity of
sovereign powers in the person of their ministers or servants." 63 It
even went so far as to direct the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, John
Jay, to draft "an act to be recommended to the legislatures of the re-
spective states, for punishing the infractions of the laws of nations, and
more especially for securing the privileges and immunities of public
Ministers from foreign powers." 6"
Four years later, a similar incident arose when a New York City
constable entered the house of the Dutch Ambassador Van Berckel
and arrested one of his servants.65 Secretary Jay complained that "the
foederal [sic] Government does not appear.., to be vested with any
judicial Powers competent to the Cognizance and Judgment of such
Cases."'66 However, a state court sentenced the unfortunate constable
to three months in jail for violating the law of nations. 67
There is no record of any civil action being filed against De
Longchamps or against the constable in the Van Berckel case.68 Nev-
ertheless, each had committed what would have been recognized as a
tort69 and, in so doing, each had violated the law of nations. The
Marbois affair, in particular, constituted a well-known case falling
squarely within the category of torts in violation of the law of nations
recognized by the 1781 resolution.70 But no federal remedy was avail-
able for Marbois, a situation the First Congress would quickly address.
61. 28 ad at 314.
62. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 116.
63. 28 JouRNALs OF rM CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 36, at 315.
64. 29 id. at 655. There is no record of Jay having drafted any such legislation. Casto,
supra note 2, at 493 n.144.
65. Casto, supra note 2, at 494.
66. 34 JouRNAts OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 36, at 111.
67. Casto, supra note 2, at 494.
68. Burley, supra note 2, at 471.
69. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
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D. The Alien Tort Clause
The new Constitution gave Congress the authority to do what it
could only recommend to the States in 1781. Oliver Ellsworth was a
member of the Continental Congress that passed the 1781 resolution
and a member of the Connecticut General Assembly that passed the
1782 act.71 His Judiciary Act enacted all the recommendations of the
1781 resolution. 2 Sections 9 and 11 gave the federal courts jurisdic-
tion over common-law crimes "cognizable under the authority of the
United States," including crimes in violation of the law of nationsY3
The Alien Tort Clause gave the district courts jurisdiction over suits
for damages based on the same violations.74
To understand how the Alien Tort Clause would provide a rem-
edy for aliens who had been the victims of torts that violated the law
of nations, one must understand the provision's common-law back-
ground. To understand why a federal remedy was desirable, one must
understand how Ellsworth and his contemporaries viewed the state
courts' handling of the law of nations and of aliens' claims. It is to
those subjects that I turn next.
1. The Clause's Relationship to the Common Law
It is important to understand the relationship between the Alien
Tort Clause and the common law because that relationship explains
how an alien might bring suit for a tort in violation of the law of na-
71. Casto, supra note 2, at 495 n.155 (noting Ellsworth's membership in the Continen-
tal Congress); Casto, supra note 51, at 902-03 (noting Ellsworth's membership in the Con-
necticut General Assembly).
72. Burley, supra note 2, at 477.
73. See Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (district court jurisdiction
over minor crimes-Le. "where no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty
stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not ex.ceeding
six months, is to be inflicted"); id. § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (circuit court jurizdiction concur-
rently with the district courts over minor crimes and exclusively over all others). Charles
Warren has shown that Congress intended this jurisdiction to include common.law crimes,
including those against the law of nations, and that Congress struck from the draft bill
provisions that would have limited this jurisdiction to statutory crimes. See Warren, supra
note 7, at 73, 77.
74. See Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73,76-77 (17S9) ("the district courts shall have
... cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the
case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States"). Suits by the United States for reimburzement of
damages paid on behalf of one of its citizens, see supra note 49-50 and accompanying text,
could be brought in district court if the amount in controversy were S100 or more, Judiciary
Act, ch. 20, § 9,1 Stat. 73, 77, and in circuit court if the amount in controversy were S5C,) or
more, id § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
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tions in the absence of an express cause of action.75 Blackstone had
observed that "the law of nations.., is... adopted in it's [sic] full
extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the
land,"'76 and American writers "generally asserted that the law of na-
tions was part of the law of the new American states and their na-
tional government. 77
At the time, violations of the law of nations were widely recog-
nized as common-law crimes. For his assault on Marbois, De
Longchamps was indicted and convicted of a common-law offense
against the law of nations, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court de-
clared, "in its full extent, is a part of the law of this State."7'T The
prosecutions of Americans for neutrality violations during the 1790s
were likewise by indictment at common law.79 Torts were the civil
counterparts of crimes,80 and the Alien Tort Clause recognized tort
liability over the full range of offenses against the law of nations. That
"torts in violation of the law of nations" were intended to reach at
least as far as "crimes in violation of the law of nations" is apparent
from the Alien Tort Clause's origin in the resolution of 1781, which
would have made them coextensive s ' Moreover, the Clause expressly
extended jurisdiction to "all causes where an alien sues for a tort only
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'
The important point is that in 1789 neither crimes nor torts in viola-
tion of the law of nations required positive legislation to be actiona-
ble; both were cognizable at common law.
Although "tort law was not a highly developed field" in the late
eighteenth century, 3 Blackstone listed as "torts" many of the same
common-law actions we would recognize today: "actions for tres-
passes, nusances [sic], assaults, defamatory words, and the like." ' It
is apparent that a tort action would frequently lie where a person
committed a violation of the law of nations. Violations of safe-con-
75. For a fuller refutation of Judge Bork's argument that an alien must have an express
cause of action to bring suit under the Clause, see infra notes 113-34 and accompanying
text.
76. 4 BLACKsrTONE, supra note 26, at *67.
77. Jay, supra note 28, at 825.
78. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116 (1784).
79. See Jay, supra note 28, at 842-45; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law:
Part One, 133 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1003, 1042-53 (1985).
80. Burley, supra note 2, at 479.
81. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
82. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (emphasis added).
83. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A ISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 261 (1973).
84. 3 BLACKSToNE, supra note 26, at *117.
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ducts would typically involve assaults. Violations of the rights of am-
bassadors could involve assault, as in the Marbois affair,- or trespass
and false imprisonment, as in the invasion of Ambassador Van
Berckel's home. 6 Acts of piracy could involve assault, trespass, and
false imprisonment.s7 Violations of treaties could implicate a variety
of torts, but it is apparent that assaults in violation of U.S. neutrality
could violate a treaty.,s Finally, as Professor Sweeney demonstrates,
actions for trespass and false imprisonment might lie in cases of
wrongful capture at sea.89
In the 1790s, federal jurisdiction over common-law crimes be-
came caught up in partisan disputes between Federalists and Republi-
cans over the powers of the central government." Ultimately, the
federal courts lost their authority over such crimes in United States v.
Hudson.9' Not so with common-law torts in violation of the law of
nations. Professor Jay has observed that "[f]or a considerable period
in early American judicial history, the federal courts were free to de-
velop a common law for civil cases... without provoking serious ob-
jections of the sort raised in Hudson.92
In 1795, after the controversies concerning common-law crimes
had begun, Attorney General William Bradford was asked to opine
on the actions that might be taken against American citizens who had
aided the French in attacking the British colony of Sierra Leone in
violation of a treaty promising U.S. neutrality.93 Ignoring the possibil-
ity of an indictment at common law, Bradford expressed some doubt
85. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
87. Although not listed in the 1781 resolution because the Articles of Confederation
already provided for it, see supra note 41, piracy was considered one of the principle of-
fenses against the law of nations, see 4 BLAcIsro-4E, supra note 26, at *63, "71-73, and
there is little doubt that it fell within the Alien Tort Clause. See generally Edwin D. Dick-
inson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HAR. L. RE%,. 334 (1925) (discussing piracy as
an offense under the law of nations and under municipal law).
88. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Several treaties of the United States
also had provisions guaranteeing safe-conducts to aliens, Randall, FederalJlnsdiction Over
International Law Claims, supra note 2, at 47 n.220 (listing provisions), and proiding im-
munities to ambassadors. Id. at 48 n.222 (listing provisions).
89. See Sweeney, supra note 2, at 465-75; see also Le Caux v. Eden, 99 Eng. Rep. 375
(K.B. 1781) (actions for trespass and false imprisonment).
90. See Jay, supra note 79, at 1039-1111.
91. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
92. Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law. Part Two, 133 U. PA. L REv. 1231,
1276 (1985).
93. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795). Bradford was Attorney General of Pennsylvania
during the Marbois affair. See 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 46 (1780) (notice of appointment). Assisted
by James Wilson, Bradford had prosecuted De Longehamps. See Respublica v. D
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as to whether the offenders could be criminally prosecuted in a U.S.
court "in consequence of the terms in which the 'Act in addition to the
act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States' is
expressed." 94 He continued:
But there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who
have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by civil
suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly
given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only,
in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United StatesYs
In short, the Founding Generation understood that the law of na-
tions was part of American common law and that a tort violating that
law would be cognizable at common law just as any other tort would
be. The Alien Tort Clause simply provided federal jurisdiction over
these common-law torts, giving aliens who could allege not just a tort
but a tort in violation of the law of nations the option of bringing suit
in federal, rather than state, court.
2. The Clause's Relationship to State Courts
If the law of nations was part of the common law, and if torts in
violation of the law of nations were common-law torts, then such torts
should have been cognizable in the courts of the several States. Yet
the 1781 resolution and Edmund Randolph's observations six years
later 96 display a fear that this was not always the case. The Alien Tort
Clause appears to have been passed partly to ensure that aliens could
sue for torts in violation of the law of nations regardless of the vagar-
Longehamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 113 (1784); see also Casto, supra note 2, at 503 n.201
(noting Bradford's participation in the Marbois affair).
94. 1 Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 93, at 59. The Act to which Bradford referred made
it a "high misdemeanor" for any "citizen of the United States ... within the territory or
jurisdiction of the same" to accept a foreign commission, enlist in a foreign army, serve on a
foreign privateer, and so on. An Act in addition to the act for punishment of certain
crimes against the United States, ch. 50, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 381, 381-83 (1794) (emphasis added)
(repealed 1818).
95. 1 Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 93, at 59 (emphasis in original). That the tort oc-
curred outside the United States posed no obstacle to a civil suit. It had been established
by Lord Mansfield's opinion in Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1030-31 (K.B. 1774),
that tort actions were "transitory" and the injured party could bring suit wherever the
tortfeasor was found. See McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241, 248 (1843) (dating doc-
trine of "transitory torts" to Mostyn); Stoddard v. Bird, 1 Kirby 65, 68 (Conn. 1786) (Ells-
worth, J.) ("right of action [for a tort] against an administrator is transitory, and the action
may be brought wherever he is found"); see also Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over Interna-
tional Law Claims, supra note 2, at 61-62 (discussing transitory torts); Casto, supra note 2,
at 503-04 (discussing transitory torts).
96. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
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ies of state law. But at least two other factors likely motivated the
First Congress to provide a federal forum for alien tort suits: a desire
for uniformity in the interpretation of the law of nations,9 7 and a fear
that state courts would be hostile to alien claims.95
Writing in The Federalist, John Jay expressed the Founding Gen-
eration's desire for a uniform interpretation of the law of nations:
Under the national government, treaties ... as well as the laws of
nations, will always be expounded in one sense... whereas adjudi-
cations on the same points and questions in thirteen States ... will
not always accord or be consistent .... The wisdom of the conven-
tion in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment
of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national govern-
ment cannot be too much commended.99
Of course, the Alien Tort Clause would not guarantee uniformity in
the interpretation of the law of nations because it only gave alien
plaintiffs the option of bringing their tort claims in federal court. As-
suming that state law permitted, aliens could still bring such claims in
state court.I0 But the Clause made sure that aliens would have the
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated under a law of nations
that was, at least in theory, "expounded in one sense" by the federal
judiciary.' 0 '
Fear that state courts would be hostile to alien claims also likely
motivated the First Congress to pass the Alien Tort Clause. As James
Madison put it famously while defending the Constitution's grant of
alienage jurisdiction: "We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get
justice done them in these [state] courts, and this has prevented many
wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us."'o'2 Alexander
97. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
99. THE FEDERaL= No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
100. District court jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Clause was "concurrent with the
courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be." Judiciary Act, ch. 20,
§ 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The concurrent circuit court jurisdiction refers to alienage juris-
diction, where the amount in controversy was $500 or more. See id. § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78;
Burley, supra note 2, at 479.
101. As it turned out, the Judiciary Act did not produce a federal judiciary particularly
well adapted to ensure the uniformity of federal law because of significant gaps in the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See William S. Dodge, Note, Congressional Con-
trol of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause Suggests
an "Essential Role," 100 YALE LJ. 1013, 1017 n.19 (1991).
102. 3 TE DEBATEs IN THE SEXMRAL STATE CONVnTIONS ON THE ADOIoN OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 583 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881).
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Hamilton made the same point more neutrally in The Federalist, when
he wrote:
As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as
well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just
causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have
cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are
concerned.10 3
The difficulty that British creditors had collecting their debts following
the peace in 1783 gave Madison and Hamilton good reason to fear the
hostility of state courts toward alien claims,1 4 and there was little rea-
son to think that this hostility toward foreign claims would be any less
pronounced in tort actions. 0 5
Without the Alien Tort Clause, aliens like Marbois or the British
victims of the attack on Sierra Leone would have been forced to bring
their civil suits in state court, unless they could meet the narrow re-
quirements for alienage jurisdiction.0 6 Even if state law permitted
such suits, state courts might prove hostile to them'0 7 and, in any
event, would not speak with "one voice" regarding the law of na-
tions.'08 In the end, Congress preferred to assure other nations that
"individuals who have been injured.., have a remedy by a civil suit in
103. THE FEDERALIsr No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
104. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1421, 1440-53; see also William R. Casto,
The First Congress's Understanding of Its Authority Over the Federal Courts' Jurisdiction,
26 B.C. L. REv. 1101, 1111-13 (1985); Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? His-
torical Foundations and Modem Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involv.
ing Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6-8 (1996); Dunlop v. Ball, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 180
(1804) ("Until the act of 1793, from the obstacles interposed by juries, and the proceedings
of some courts of Virginia, a general opinion prevailed among the inhabitants of the state
of Virginia, and among juries, that a British debt could not be recovered."). For further
discussion of the British debt problem and its relationship to the word "only" in the Alien
Tort Clause, see infra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
105. See Casto, supra note 104, at 1114 (quoting a speech by William Paterson during
the debate on the Judiciary Act) ("One would assume that those 'local Prejudices' that
alienage and diversity jurisdiction were designed to remedy would be particularly virulent
in tort actions.").
106. Marbois would not have been able to rely on the alienage grant because his assail-
ant De Longchamps was also an alien. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303
(1809). Moreover, as Professor Casto has pointed out, the $500 amount-in-controversy
requirement would have excluded virtually all tort suits at the time. Casto, supra note 2, at
497 & n.168.
107. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. Cf. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
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the courts of the United States" 1 9 than to explain that the "nature of
a federal union" left Congress the role "of advising in many of those
cases in which other governments decree."110
Thus, the original intent of the Alien Tort Clause was to provide
the broad civil remedy for violations of the law of nations that the
Continental Congress had sought since 1781. The Alien Tort Clause
accomplished this purpose by giving the district courts jurisdiction
over a category of tort actions-those that violated the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States-that were already cognizable at com-
mon law. Moreover, by providing a federal remedy for such torts, the
First Congress could protect against the vagaries of state law, the hos-
tility of state courts, and differences in their interpretations of the law
of nations, sparing the new nation the sort of embarrassment that had
attended the Marbois affair.
ll. The "Originalists"' Objections
Judge Bork and Professor Sweeney both fly the "originalist" ban-
ner. Both argue that the First Congress' understanding of the Alien
Tort Clause is the key to its correct interpretation."' Together, they
raise three principal arguments against the broad interpretation of the
Clause adopted by Filartiga and its progeny:"'- (1) that an express
cause of action is needed, which the Clause does not provide; (2) that
the Clause should be limited to those torts that violated the law of
nations in 1789; and (3) that the Clause should be limited to prize
cases.
In this Part, I show that history contradicts each of these argu-
ments. Judge Bork's argument for requiring an express cause of ac-
tion is patently antihistorical. The very notion of an express cause of
action did not appear until 1848-nearly sixty years after Congress
passed the Alien Tort Clause. In 1789, it was understood that the
109. 1 Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 93, at 59 (emphasis in original); see supra notes 93-95
and accompanying text.
110. 28 JouNAis OF Ta CoNINraAL CONGRESS 1774-17S9, supra note 36, at 314;
see supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
111. See, eg., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1934)
(Bork, J., concurring) ("Congress' understanding of the 'law of nations' in 1789 is relevant
to a consideration of whether Congress, by enacting section 1350, intended to open the
federal courts to the vindication of the violation of any right recognized by international
law."); Sweeney, supra note 2, at 477 ("we cannot understand what the clause means so
long as we do not know what the word 'tort' meant in the law of nations and treaties of the
United States back [in 1789]").
112. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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common law provided the right to sue for a tort in violation of the law
of nations, just as it provided the right to sue for any other kind of
tort. Judge Bork's other argument-that the Clause should be limited
to those torts that violated the law of nations in 1789-has a more
"originalist" ring, but it also is out of tune with the Founding Genera-
tion's views. Not only did the members of the First Congress under-
stand that the law of nations had evolved, they expected that
evolution to continue-indeed, they specifically provided for it. Pro-
fessor Sweeney's error lies in a somewhat different direction. He fo-
cuses intently on some parts of the Alien Tort Clause's text and
history, but completely ignores others. Professor Sweeney's suggested
connection between the Clause and prize cases is intriguing, but it
runs counter to the historical evidence of the Clause's purpose re-
counted in Part II. I argue, moreover, that his interpretation cannot
be correct because it is at odds with the plain meaning of the text,
renders the Clause largely redundant, and is contradicted by the earli-
est interpretations of the Clause. In the end, Professor Sweeney's ar-
gument turns out to be only deceptively historical.
A. Requiring an Express Cause of Action
In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork took the position that, notwithstanding
section 1350's grant of jurisdiction, "it is essential that there be an
explicit grant of a cause of action before a private plaintiff be allowed
to enforce principles of international law in a federal tribunal." '113 He
spent much of the rest of his opinion arguing that no such cause of
action existed for human rights violations." 4
Although Judge Bork professes allegiance to the original under-
standing of the Alien Tort Clause,"' his express cause of action re-
113. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
114. See id. at 808-19. In response to Judge Bork's opinion, Congress passed the Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act. Pub. L. No. 256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); see HousE REPORT, supra
note 6, at 3-4, reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84,86 (1992) (noting that the Act was passed to
provide "an unambiguous and modem basis for a cause of action" in light of Judge Bork's
opinion in Tel-Oren). The House Report states that "claims based on torture or summary
executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered [by] section
1350. That statute should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already
exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law." HousE RE.
PORT, supra note 6, at 4, reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (1992). Thus, it is plain that
Congress does not agree with Judge Bork that an express cause of action is required to
bring suit under the Alien Tort Statute or that the Alien Tort Statute should be limited to
those torts that violated the law of nations in 1789. See infra notes 135-51 and accompany-
ing text.
115. See supra note 111.
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quirement would have mystified the First Congress. According to the
Supreme Court, "cause of action" became a legal term of art only in
1848 when the New York Code of Procedure abolished the distinction
between law and equity "and simply required a plaintiff to include in
his complaint '[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of ac-
tion.""' 6 Judge Bork's application to a 1789 provision of a require-
ment that did not even exist for nearly sixty more years is a strange
argument for an originalist.117
As we have seen, Ellsworth and the First Congress understood
that torts in violation of the law of nations would be cognizable at
common law, just as any other tort would be.' In Tel-Oren, the
plaintiffs argued that common law provided them with a cause of ac-
tion,119 but Judge Bork dismissed this argument with more antihistori-
cal reasoning. Plaintiffs' argument, he wrote, "reflects a confusion of
two distinct meanings of 'common law." '120 On the one hand, there
was common law like that of contracts and torts, "whose origins can
be traced to the medieval English legal system." 12 1 On the other
hand, there was "federal common law," which "has been used 'to refer
generally to federal rules of decision where the authority for a federal
rule is not explicitly or clearly found in federal statutory or constitu-
tional command." ' 12 Judge Bork continued:
To say that international law is part of federal common law is to say
only that it is nonstatutory and nonconstitutional law to be applied,
in appropriate cases, in municipal courts. It is not to say that, like
the common law of contract and tort, for example, by itself it affords
individuals the right to ask for judicial relief.12
Yet this reasoning too would have mystified the First Congress.
The notion of a specialized "federal common law" distinct from tradi-
tional common law is a post-Erie phenomenon.1 24 Today, interna-
116. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237 (1979) (quoting 184S N.Y. Laws, ch. 379,
§ 120(2)).
117. See D'Amato, Judge Bork, supra note 2, at 95 ("This rather late arrival of the term
upon the legal scene raises at least a question when it is applied to interpret the alien tort
statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350), originally passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1769.'")
118. See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
119. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810 (Bork, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 811.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECiSLERt'S THE FEDnAL
CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 770 (2d ed. 1973)).
123. Id.
124. See Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (193S); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 3S3, 45-.1 1964).
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tional law is classified as federal common law,"2 5 but in 1789 "'federal
common law' was not a meaningful term.' 1 26 The Founding Genera-
tion did distinguish between local common law, which might vary
from State to State, and general common law, which did not, 2 7 but
general common law was not thought of as distinctively federal, and it
was binding on the States as well as the federal government. 12  As
Professor Henkin has put it, "[e]arly in our history, the question
whether international law was state law or federal law was not an is-
sue: it was 'the common law."1 29 It was not the plaintiffs in Tel-Oren
who were confused about the relationship between the common law
and the Alien Tort Clause, but rather Judge Bork.130
The First Congress expected "torts in violation of the law of na-
tions" to be actionable at common law in the same way as other
torts.' 3' Indeed, Judge Bork is forced to admit as much-at least with
respect to violations of safe-conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.' 3 Otherwise, his interpretation would have
rendered the Alien Tort Clause a nullity when it was passed,' 33 since
Congress provided no express cause of action in 1789.134 But if torts
like piracy that violated the law of nations in 1789 were actionable
without an express cause of action, why is an express cause of action
required for torts like torture that violate the law of nations today?
Here, Judge Bork must fall back on a different, and more historical
sounding, argument: that the First Congress only intended to allow
alien tort suits for those violations of the law of nations that existed
when the Judiciary Act was passed-that the law of nations should be
frozen in 1789.
125. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964); Louis Henkin,
International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1555, 1559-60 (1984).
126. Jay, supra note 92, at 1270.
127. Id. at 1263-64.
128. Id. at 1274-75; see, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dal.) 111, 116
(1784) ("[the law of nations], in its full extent, is a part of the law of this State").
129. Henkin, supra note 125, at 1557.
130. The simplest way to translate the Alien Tort Clause into modem terms is to hold,
as federal courts have repeatedly done, that section 1350 provides both a cause of action
and jurisdiction. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic
v. Karadli6, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,
179 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
131. See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
132. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813-14 & n.22 (Bork, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring); D'Amato, Judge Bork, supra note 2, at 100.
134. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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B. Freezing the Law of Nations
Judge Bork conceded in Tel-Oren that "[t]he substantive rules of
international law may evolve.' 13 - But that did not mean, in his view,
that torts in violation of the new rules would be actionable without
further congressional action, specifically an express cause of action.12'
Judge Bork assumes that the First Congress intended to limit the torts
that were actionable under the Alien Tort Clause to violation of safe-
conducts, infringement of ambassadors' rights, piracy and those (pre-
sumably few) others that can be shown to have violated the law of
nations in 1789.137 That assumption, I argue, is demonstrably
incorrect.
The Founding Generation recognized that the law of nations had
evolved over time. In 1793, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the rights of
neutral traders were governed by the law of nations: "I mean the
principles of that law as they have been liberalized in latter times by
the refinement of manners & morals, and evidenced by the Declara-
tions, Stipulations, and Practice of every civilized Nation. '"13 Justice
Wilson, writing three years later in Ware v. Hylton,139 observed that
"[w]hen the United States declared their independence, they were
bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and
refinement.'140
The Founding Generation expected this process of "refinement"
to continue.'41 Obviously, the United States would continue to con-
clude treaties with foreign powers, and it would be absurd to suggest
that the First Congress intended to limit the Alien Tort Clause only to
violations of those treaties that existed in 1789. So too with the law of
nations. The Constitution expressly provided for its development by
conferring on Congress the authority to "define and punish... Of-
135. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 816 (Bork, J., concurring).
136. See id. As noted above, Congress has provided such a cause of action in rcsponse
to Judge Bork's opinion. See supra note 114.
137. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 815-16 (Bork, J., concurring).
138. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (May 7, 1793) (emphasis ad-
ded), quoted in Jay, supra note 28, at 846.
139. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
140. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
141. Justice Story's famous observation in United States r. La Jeune Eugenle, that "[ilt
does not follow ... that because a principle cannot be found settled by the consent or
practice of nations at one time, it is to be concluded, that at no subsequent pe.riod the
principle can be considered as incorporated into the public code of nations," seems to
reflect the Founding Generation's view. 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No.
15,551), overruled on other grounds, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
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fenses against the Law of Nations."14 The First Congress exercised
this power almost immediately, providing statutory punishments for
piracy,143  violations of safe-conducts, 144  and assaults on
ambassadors. 145
The Founding Generation also expected the law of nations to
evolve through decisions by common-law courts as cases were brought
before them. The Continental Congress recognized this when it rec-
ommended "to the several states to erect a tribunal in each State, or
to vest one already existing with power to decide on offences against
the law of nations, not contained in the foregoing enumeration ... ,"146
Courts were thought to be capable of expounding the law of nations
because that law was based on principles of natural law.'47 As Justice
Story explained in United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, "every doctrine,
that may be fairly deduced by correct reasoning from the rights and
duties of nations, and the nature of moral obligation, may theoreti-
cally be said to exist in the law of nations.'1 48
What makes the late eighteenth century view of the law of na-
tions different from our own is the characterization of its evolution.
The First Congress would have viewed the elaboration of the law of
nations by common-law courts as the "discovery" of a pre-existing
natural law.149 The First Congress would have viewed its own legisla-
tion defining offenses against the law of nations as "declaratory" of
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
143. See An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States, ch. 9,
§ 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113-114 (1790).
144. See id. § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118.
145. See id. For a discussion of the Offenses Clause's history, see Charles D. Siegal,
Deference and Its Dangers: Congress' Power to "Define ... Offenses Against the Law of
Nations," 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 874-79 (1988).
146. 21 JOURNALS OF THE COrmNENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 36, at 1137
(emphasis added). For further discussion of the 1781 resolution and its relationship to the
Alien Tort Clause, see supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
148. 26 F. Cas. at 846; see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *66 ("The law of na-
tions is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent
among the civilized inhabitants of the world."); 4 id. at *66-67 ("such rules must necessarily
result from those principles of natural justice, in which all the learned of every nation
agree").
149. See Jay, supra note 28, at 833 (referring to "the prepositivist understanding that
judges merely discovered law (a point of view especially important with regard to the law
of nations in that it was formed from international sources)"). In this, the law of nations
did not differ from the common law. See MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AEmRICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 7 (1977) ("common law rules were discovered, statutes were
made").
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the same pre-existing law." ° But this difference in characterization
makes its conception of the law of nations no less dynamic than our
own. Thus, there is little reason to think that the First Congress ex-
pected or intended that the Alien Tort Clause would be confined to
those torts that violated the law of nations in 1789. Had he so desired,
Ellsworth could easily have specified a limited number of torts to
which the Clause would extend. He did not. Instead he wrote that
the district courts should have cognizance "of all causes where an
alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States," '' and he did so with the knowledge that the
law of nations had evolved and would continue to do so.
C. Limiting the Clause to Prize Cases
In contrast to Judge Bork's arguments, Professor Sweeney's the-
sis is firmly grounded in history. It therefore not only requires but
deserves a more detailed response. As a good "originalist," Professor
Sweeney begins with the text of the Alien Tort Clause: "That the dis-
trict courts shall have... cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."' 52 Professor Sweeney is troubled by
the word "only," and he sets out to find a historical explanation for
that word. 53 His solution is to read the Alien Tort Clause against the
background of prize law."5 ' During wartime, the law of prize allowed
government ships and privateers to capture and condemn enemy ships
as well as enemy goods carried on neutral ships.'-'s In cases of wrong-
150. See Jay, supra note 28, at 827 (quoting a grand jury charge by William Paterson)
("Consistent with the English tradition, American legislation in an area subject to the law
of nations was said to be 'declaratory of the law of nations."); see also 4 BL rC ,
supra note 26, at *67 ("those acts of parliament, which have from time to time been made
to enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of it's [sic] decisions, are not to
be considered as introductive of a new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamen-
tal constitutions of the kingdom").
151. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat 73, 77 (1789) (emphasis added).
152. Id., 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
153. See Sweeney, supra note 2, at 446 ("'I never could see why granting jurisdiction
over a 'tort' should be read as implying a grant of jurisdiction over something other than a
tort, thus creating a need to exclude the possibility.").
154. Professor Sweeney is not the first to suggest the relevance of prize cases in unde.r-
standing the Clause. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1016-17. In Argentmne Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., the Supreme Court expressed some doubt about the con-
nection between the Clause and prize cases, noting that the "Alien Tort Statute makes no
mention of prize jurisdiction." 488 U.S. 428, 436-37 (19S9).
155. See Sweeney, supra note 2, at 447.
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ful capture or where the captor had injured persons or property
aboard the captured vessel, the law of prize also permitted reparations
against the captor.' 56 Professor Sweeney recognizes that where the
legality of the capture as prize was at issue the district courts would
have exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty, 5 7 but he suggests that the
Alien Tort Clause was designed to deal with those cases in which "the
legality of the capture was not in issue, and the suit was 'only' for the
reparation in damages of a wrong related to a capture."'' 55
Intriguing as it is, there are several problems with Professor
Sweeney's thesis, which ultimately show that his interpretation is only
deceptively historical. First, his use of history is too selective. In fo-
cusing narrowly on prize cases, Professor Sweeney ignores the sub-
stantial historical evidence that the Alien Tort Clause was intended to
serve the broader purpose of providing civil liability for all tortious
violations of the law of nations.159 Second, the disproportionate
weight Professor Sweeney places on prize cases in order to explain the
word "only" requires distortion of other parts of the text. Thus, Pro-
fessor Sweeney reads "tort" to mean "'wrongs' under the law of
prize;' 160 I read it to mean "tort." He reads "all causes" to mean
causes "related to a capture, but not involving the legality of the cap-
ture as prize;"' 6' I read it to mean "all causes." Third, Professor
Sweeney's thesis renders the Alien Tort Clause largely redundant.
The district courts already had jurisdiction in admiralty over maritime
torts, and the Clause would have served no useful purpose if it were
limited to granting jurisdiction over those same cases a second time. 162
And finally, the earliest efforts to interpret and apply the Alien Tort
Clause contradict his thesis. 163 Three of these points require further
discussion: the meaning of the word "tort"; the district courts' juris-
diction over maritime torts; and the early efforts to interpret the
Clause. This section ends by considering why Ellsworth might have
inserted the word "only," which so troubles Professor Sweeney. 64
156. See id. at 447, 467-75.
157. Sweeney, supra note 2, at 482; see also id. at 457-58 (discussing Le Caux v. Eden, 99
Eng. Rep. 375 (K.B. 1781), and Lindo v. Rodney, 99 Eng. Rep. 385 (K.B. 1782)).
158. Il at 482.
159. See supra notes 25-110 and accompanying text.
160. Sweeney, supra note 2, at 475.
161. Id. at 481; see also id. at 482. Professor Sweeney adds that these cases involved "an
odd situation not likely to recur in the future." Id. at 483.
162. See infra notes 175-201 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 202-19 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
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1. The Meaning of the Word "Tort"
Professor Sweeney's reading of "tort" as referring exclusively to
"'wrongs' under the law of prize" 165 is at odds with the common un-
derstanding of that word, not just today but in 1789 as well. As I have
already noted, Blackstone listed as "torts" many of the same common-
law actions we would recognize today: "actions for trespasses,
nusances [sic], assaults, defamatory words, and the like."1'' Professor
Sweeney concedes that "in the law of prize ... the word 'tort' was
seldom used."' 67 To show that "torts" could refer to wrongs under the
law of prize, he relies on a note on prize practice in which Justice
Story uses the word in that manner.6 5 But this shows only that "tort"
could refer to wrongs under the law of prize, not that it was limited to
those wrongs. 69 Justice Story's use of the word in De Lovio v. Boit,170
his seminal decision on the scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction,
clearly shows that Story thought of "tort" as having a broader mean-
ing than wrongs under the law of prize. For example, in examining the
effect of English statutes limiting admiralty jurisdiction, he explained
that:
[Cjonsistently with these statutes, the admiralty may still exercise
jurisdiction, 1. Over torts and injuries upon the high seas and in
ports within the ebb and flow of the tide, and in great streams below
the first bridges; 2. Over all maritime contracts arising at home or
abroad; 3. Over matters of prize and its incidents.171
165. Sweeney, supra note 2, at 475.
166. 3 BLAcKnSoNF, supra note 26, at *117; see also supra notes 83-S9 and accompany-
ing text.
167. Sweeney, supra note 2, at 475.
168. See id at 475-76 (quoting Henry Wheaton, Additional Notes on the Principles and
Practice in Prize Causes, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.)(app.) 5 (1817)). For Professor Sweeney's ex-
planation of Justice Story's claim to authorship, see id at 464-65.
169. See also Kadic v. Karadi6, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996) (denying p2tition for
rehearing) ("Even if the tort of wrongfully boarding in time of %%ar a ship suspected of
aiding the enemy was the tort that prompted the 1st Congress to create federal court juris-
diction for aliens suffering damages in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States, it does not follow that the statute should be confined to this tort.").
170. 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
171. Id at 426 (emphases added); see also idt at 419 ("at a very early period, the admi-
ralty had cognizance of all questions of prize; of torts and offences ... upon the high seas;
of maritime contracts and navigation..."); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 335 (1816) (Story, J.) ("the admiralty jurisdiction embraces all questions of prize and
salvage, in the correct adjudication of which foreign nations are deeply interested; it em-
braces also maritime torts, contract, and offences, in which the principles of the law and
comity of nations often form an essential inquiry").
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Justice Story's enumeration shows that he viewed "torts" as encom-
passing not only those injuries that might arise duringcaptures, but all
injuries occurring at sea. In other cases, Story used the word to refer
to torts on land.172
Ultimately, Professor Sweeney's claim that Ellsworth used "tort"
to refer only to wrongs under the law of prize must rest on his asser-
tion that there were no torts in violation of the law of nations and no
torts in violation of United States treaties except in the prize con-
text.'7 3 But that assertion is mistaken, as the discussion in Part II has
shown. The First Congress envisioned torts in violation of the law of
nations beyond the limited context of prize and specifically designed
the Alien Tort Clause to provide a federal forum for these suits.174
2. Jurisdiction Over Maritime Torts
Under Professor Sweeney's reading, the category of cases with
which the Alien Tort Clause was designed to deal is narrow indeed.
Under English law, the admiralty court had prize jurisdiction "not
only of the question, 'prize or not prize,' but all of its conse-
quences."'175 Moreover, admiralty's prize jurisdiction was exclusive of
the common-law courts. 176 Tort actions for trespass or false imprison-
ment were thought to be "consequences" of the prize question be-
cause the argument that a ship had lawfully been taken as prize was a
complete defense to these torts.' 7 Even if the suit were only for tort
damages because the illegality of the capture had been previously de-
termined, English law held that the suit belonged exclusively to the
admiralty's prize jurisdiction. 78 Thus, most tort suits related to a cap-
172. See, e.g., Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1123 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17,600); Meeker v. Wilson, 16 F. Cas. 1311, 1312 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 9392).
173. See Sweeney, supra note 2, at 476.
174. See supra notes 25-110 and accompanying text.
175. Le Caux v. Eden, 99 Eng. Rep. 375, 379 (K.B. 1781) (Buller, J.).
176. See id.; Lindo v. Rodney, 99 Eng. Rep. 385, 386 (K.B. 1782) (Mansfield, J.) ("the
Courts of Westminster-Hall never have attempted to take cognizance of the question,
'prize or not prize"'); 3 BLAcrrTON, supra note 26, at *108 ("In case of prizes ... the
courts of admiralty have an undisturbed and exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same
according to the law of nations.").
177. See Le Caux, 99 Eng. Rep. at 384 ("if the ship be a lawful prize, it is not a false
imprisonment").
178. See id. ("The question of 'prize or not prize,' must still arise, notwithstanding the
acquittal in the Admiralty, though it is true that the sentence in that Court is conclusive on
the question.").
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ture would already have fallen within the exclusive prize jurisdiction
of the federal district courts. 79
The case Professor Sweeney has in mind as an example of a tort
suit related to a capture in which the legality of the capture was not in
issue is Talbot v. The Commanders and Owners of Three Brigs.1Y I But
even here, it seems to me, a correct application of prize law would
have put the case within the exclusive prize jurisdiction that the Judici-
ary Act ultimately vested in the federal district courts. In Talbot, the
High Court of Errors and Appeals of Pennsylvania tried to find a way
around the rule that prize jurisdiction covered not just "the question
'prize or not prize,' but all of its consequences, "' 18s by supposing that it
was unnecessary to determine whether either Talbot's original capture
of the Betsey or the three brigs' subsequent capture of the Betsey from
Talbot was a capture as prize.1- However, the commanders and own-
ers of the three brigs were entitled to argue and did argue, as a de-
fense to Talbot's claim, that their capture was a lawful capture as
prize.ls 3 In concluding that the three brigs' taking of the Betsey "was
not a real but a pretended capture, as prize, ' the Pennsylvania
court did not avoid the question "prize or not prize"-it decided that
question. Under Le Caux, therefore, the case fell within the prize ju-
risdiction. Moreover, there was no question that Talbot's original tak-
ing of the Betsey was a capture as prize, and both the Pennsylvania
court and Professor Sweeney appear to concede that this fact would
place the case within the prize jurisdiction if Le Caux had been
followed.SS5
Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine tort suits related to a cap-
ture that would not fall within the exclusive prize jurisdiction of the
179. Although Section 9 of the Judiciary Act does not mention prize jurisdiction, there
is no doubt that it was included in the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. See
Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794); The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 546, 557-58 (1818); see also William R Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiraty
Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 A.s. J. LErAL HB-r. 117,145
(1993) ("There is no express reference to cases of capture [in the Judiciary Act], but [Ells-
worth] undoubtedly viewed these proceedings as the epitome of cases dscribed by the
Act's reference to 'civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'").
180. 1 U.S. (1 DalU.) 95 (1784). For Professor Sweeney's discussion of the Talbot casz,
see Sweeney, supra note 2, at 468-69, 478-S1.
181. Le Caux, 99 Eng. Rep. at 379; see supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
182. See Talbot, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 103-07.
183. See id. at 103.
184. ld. at 104.
185. See id. at 104-06 (noting and rejecting English decisions); S ,.eeney, supra note 2, at
481 ("the Court [in Talbot] bluntly declared that even if the English courts %ould call the
case one of capture 'as prize,' it would not follow their decision").
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federal district courts. First, there might be suits not involving tres-
pass or false imprisonment but solely for mistreatment.,"S Second,
there might be suits related to captures not during time of war, for
captures as prize could only occur during war.lt 7 The problem with
Professor Sweeney's argument is that these cases would still have
fallen within the district courts' admiralty and maritime jurisdiction on
the "instance side,"'" which makes one wonder what purpose the
Alien Tort Clause was supposed to serve if limited as Professor Swee-
ney contends.
To understand this point, some further background on the scope
of federal admiralty jurisdiction is necessary. Under the second clause
of Section 9, district courts had:
[E]xclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost,
navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures are
made, on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten
or more tons burthen, within their respective districts as well as
upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a com-
mon law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.189
Justice Story examined the scope of this jurisdiction at length in De
Lovio v. Boit 9 ° and concluded "without the slightest hesitation" that
it "comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries."'191 In-
186. See Le Caux v. Eden, 99 Eng. Rep. 375,379 (K.B. 1781) (Willes, J.) ("I will not say
there may not be cases where this [common-law] Court would have a concurrent jurisdic-
tion; if, for instance, personal ill-treatment should be used, not the necessary effect of the
capture.").
187. See Lindo v. Rodney, 99 Eng. Rep. 385, 386 (K.B. 1782) (Mansfield, J.) ("A thing
being done upon the high sea, don't [sic] exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts of Common
Law. For, seizing, stopping, or taking, a ship, upon the high sea, not as prize, an action will
lie; but for taking, as prize, no action will lie.").
188. As Professor Sweeney explains, "[tihe court of admiralty in England was divided
into two sides: the 'instance side' and the 'prize side."' Sweeney, supra note 2, at 460.
Cases that did not fall on the "prize side" but were still within the admiralty court's juris-
diction were considered to fall on the "instance side." See id.; accord Talbot, 1 U.S. (1
Dall.) at 98 ("It is acknowledged by the counsel for the appellants, that if this is not a cause
of prize, the Court of Admiralty might take cognizance as an Instance Court .....
189. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
190. 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
191. Id. at 444. Justice Story found that in England "the jurisdiction of the admiralty
... extended to all maritime contracts ... and to all torts, injuries, and offences, on the high
seas, and in ports, and havens, as far as the ebb and flow of the tide." Id. at 441. "Ibming
to the United States, he found the broad scope of admiralty jurisdiction confirmed by the
Constitution's phrase "admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, el. 3
(emphasis added); see De Lovio, 7 F. Cas. at 442-43. Justice Story reasoned that the word
"maritime" was added to "remove every latent doubt" about the scope of the admiralty
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deed, one need look no further than Talbot for confirmation that suits
for damages related to a capture in which the legality of the capture
was (supposedly 92) not at issue were within the admiralty
jurisdiction.193
Of course, despite the reference to the district courts' admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction being "exclusive," it was not considered to
be so in all cases. Specifically, the "saving to suitors" clause reserved
to common-law courts, both federal and state, concurrent jurisdiction
over those suits they had traditionally heard at common law.19  Those
suits appear to have included torts arising on the high seas, with the
exception of those within the prize jurisdiction. In De Lovio, Justice
Story concluded that "the courts of common law, by a silent and
steady march, have gradually extended the limits of their own author-
ity, until they have usurped or acquired concurrent jurisdiction over
all causes, except of prize, within the cognizance of the admiralty."1 9S
jurisdiction and to give the federal courts jurisdiction over "all maritime cases." Id. at 443.
"Upon any other construction," he wrote, "the word 'maritime' would be mere tautology."
Id.
Professor Casto has recently offered a different explanation of the word "maritime,"
arguing that it confirmed the federal courts' jurisdiction over revenue cases, which in Eng-
land were tried in the Exchequer. See Casto, supra note 179, at 133 n.87. However, even
Professor Casto does not question that the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to
the federal courts included private contract and tort claims. See id. at 153 ("The Founding
Generation clearly understood that admiralty courts frequently adjudicated private mari-
time claims.").
192. See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
193. See Talbot, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) at 98-99 (rejecting the argument that common-law
courts had exclusive jurisdiction and upholding the jurisdiction of the admiralty court); see
also Sweeney, supra note 2, at 481 (Talbot "affirmed the jurisdiction of the Admiralty
Court as an instance court over a proceeding brought 'only' for the reparation in damages
of a wrong related to a capture, but not involving the legality of the capture as prize.").
Blackstone also stated that the admiralty courts "have jurisdiction and power to try
and determine all maritime causes" including "such injuries, which, though they are in
their nature of common law cognizance... [are] committed on the high seas.. .. " 3
Bt.ciasToNcE, supra note 26, at *106. He appears to have thought that where the common-
law courts had jurisdiction, they would exclude admiralty. See 3 id. at *106-03. But that
position, even as a matter of English law, was soundly refuted by Justice Story. See De
Lovio, 7 F. Cas. at 429-31.
194. See Garcia y Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185, 183 (1870); accord Ameri-
can Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 984 (1994) ("Federal-court jurisdiction over
[admiralty and maritime] cases... has never been entirely exclusive.").
195. De Lovio, 7 F. Cas. at 426. Justice Story was critical of the common laWs usurpa-
tion, commenting that "it is difficult to perceive" on "what principles of the ancient com-
mon law this extension of jurisdiction can be supported." Id. The Pennsylvania court in
Talbot was similarly critical of common-law jurisdiction over torts on the high seas, calling
them "not properly cognizable at common law." 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) at 99.
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To summarize, it seems that the class of cases Professor Sweeney
has in mind fell within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
district courts and that the state courts enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction
over those cases by virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause. The ques-
tion, then, is what the Alien Tort Clause was supposed to accomplish
if it were limited as Professor Sweeney argues. One could argue that
it might have permitted an alien to sue either in admiralty or in law,
but it is difficult to see why Ellsworth and the First Congress would
have thought this necessary or desirable. Suits in admiralty were gen-
erally viewed as more convenient because all the parties could be
joined in one action. 196
The right to a jury trial was preserved in suits at common law, but
why an alien tort plaintiff would want his case heard by a jury of
Americans is hard to fathom.197 During the First Congress' work on
the Judiciary Act, none other than Oliver Ellsworth defended alienage
jurisdiction to one of his colleagues on the ground that "[j]uries were
too apt to be biased against [foreigners], in favor of their own citizens
& acquaintances."' 198 Thomas Jefferson likewise thought that "[iun
disputes between a foreigner and a native, a trial by jury may be im-
196. See Talbot, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) at 99 ("In the present case, the owners, masters and
sailors of the three brigs could not be jointly sued at common law. If they could not, what
a multiplicity of actions must be brought? Supposing the owners, commander and men of
the Argo could join in a suit at common law, one of them might destroy the action by a
release. The vessels are not liable in the same manner at common law, as they are in a
Court of Admiralty."); see also DeLovio, 7 F. Cas. at 437 ("it is more convenient for
seamen to sue in the admiralty, because they may all join in one suit").
197. See Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) ("And the trial of issues in fact,
in the district courts, in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
shall be by jury."); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
Professor Holt has argued that the Constitutional Convention, fearing the prejudice of
juries against creditors in particular, conspired to limit the jury right. See Holt, supra note
104, at 1468-69. He points to the absence in the original Constitution of a jury right in civil
cases, see U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2 ("The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury."), and to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction "both as to
Law and Fact," U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, which might have been used to retry cases in
which a biased jury was suspected. Holt, supra note 104, at 1468-69. That such efforts were
ultimately limited by the Judiciary Act and the Seventh Amendment does not diminish the
fact that some of the Framers were deeply suspicious that juries would not act impartially
in at least some cases.
198. Letter from William Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9-16, 1789) (referring to
conversation with Ellsworth), quoted in Holt, supra note 104, at 1484.
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proper."1" He suggested that, if such cases were not excepted from
the jury right, aliens should at least be given "the medietas linguae in
civil as well as criminal cases." 20° The unattractiveness of a jury op-
tion to alien tort plaintiffs is confirmed by the fact that none of the
aliens who invoked the Clause during the 1790s used it to obtain a jury
trial, preferring to bring their suits as libelants in admiralty.a 1 In
short, Professor Sweeney's reading of the Alien Tort Clause as limited
to cases in which the district courts already had admiralty jurisdiction
renders the Clause largely redundant.
3. Early Interpretations of the Clause
If Professor Sweeney's interpretation of the Alien Tort Clause
were correct, one would expect to find that it had been espoused by
some early interpreter. At the very least, one would expect that early
interpretations of the Clause would not be inconsistent with his inter-
pretation. As it turns out, however, neither is true. Although the
Alien Tort Clause was rarely used during the early part of our his-
tory,2' two district courts and one Attorney General attempted to
interpret the Clause in the 1790s. Each of these early interpretations
contradicts Professor Sweeney's restrictive reading of the Clause.
199. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 178), reprinted n 13
Tsm PAPEzs OF THoNixs JEFERsoN 442 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956).
200. Id The jury de medietate linguae was a jury composed one half of aliens. %%hich
English law had long provided in cases where an alien was a party. See Deborah A. Rami-
rez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de Medietate. Linguae: A
History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. 1Ev. 777,785 (1994) (citing 27 Edw, 3. st. 2.
ch. 8 (1353) (Eng.) and 28 Edw. 3, ch. 13, § 2 (1354) (Eng.)). Blackstone observed that
juries de medietate linguae were designed to provide a "more impartial trial." 3 BiAcx.
sToNE, supra note 26, at *360. However, despite indications of American jurors' hostility
to aliens' claims, see supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text, the right to a jury de
medietate linguae was guaranteed by neither the Constitution nor federal statute. Cf.
United States v. Cartacho, 25 F. Cas. 312 (C.C.D. Va. 123) (No. 14,73S) (exercising discre-
tion to grant a jury de medietate linguae to an alien accused of piracy). For a thorough
discussion of state law on juries de medietate linguae, see Levis H. LaRue, A Jury of One's
Peers, 33 VAsH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 850-62 (1976).
201. See Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9S95); Bolchos v. Dar-
rel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); see also infra notes 203-16 and accompanying
text (discussing Moxon and Bolchos). The decisions in Moxon and Boldios, in %hich juris-
diction was asserted under both the admiralty clause and the Alien Tort Clau2.e suggest
that the Clause extends to tort suits that would already be within the district courts' admi-
ralty jurisdiction. In critiquing Professor Sweeney's argument, I do not mean to suggest
that torts falling within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction were ercluded from the
scope of the Alien Tort Clause. My point is simply that the Clause would have served little
purpose if limited to cases that were already within the admiralty jurisdiction.
202. See Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims, supra note 2, at 4-
5 n.15 (listing cases asserting jurisdiction under the Clause prior to Fdartiga).
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Jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Clause was asserted in two early
cases as a supplement to the district courts' admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. In Moxon v. The Fanny,2"3 a French privateer captured a
British ship within the territorial waters of the United States, which
was neutral. The owners sought restitution of the ship and its cargo as
well as damages for detention of the ship.2° They argued that the
district court had cognizance of the case under its "admiralty and mar-
itime jurisdiction" and because the court was "particularly by law
vested with authority where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the laws of nations, &c.-and this is a case falling under that
description. ' 2°5
The district court dismissed the suit on what we would call polit-
ical question grounds206 but it did state in dictum that the suit could
not be maintained under the Alien Tort Clause.20 7 Because the suit
sought restitution of the ship and its cargo in addition to damages, the
court reasoned, "it cannot be called a suit for a tort only. '208 Moxon's
interpretation of the word "only" was different from Professor Swee-
ney's. According to the district court, whether a suit was one for a
"tort only" did not turn on whether the legality of the capture was at
issue-indeed, the district court held that the legality of the capture
was at issue in Moxon.209 Rather, the district court thought the case
was not one for "tort only" because of the remedy that was sought,
and specifically because the remedy sought was not simply damages
but also restitution.210
The second early case interpreting the Alien Tort Clause was
Boichos v. Darrel,2 ' in which a French privateer captured as prize a
Spanish vessel carrying slaves mortgaged to a Spanish citizen by a
British citizen. Once in port, the slaves were seized and sold by the
mortgagee's agent, and the privateer brought suit against the agent
203. 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895).
204. Id. at 943.
205. Id.
206. Whether it was lawful to take a prize within the territorial waters of a neutral state
depended on whether the neutral state would allow it. See iU. at 946. Whether it should be
allowed in this case was a question the court felt it ought to leave to the political branches.
See id. at 947.
207. See id. at 947-48.
208. Id. at 948.
209. See id. at 947 ("it is impossible to enquire into the question of trespass, without
involving that of prize or no prize"). The court's ruling on this point is consistent with Le
Caux v. Eden, 99 Eng. Rep. 375 (K.B. 1781). See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
210. See 17 F. Cas. at 948.
211. 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
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claiming that the proceeds of the sale belonged to him."' The district
court held that the suit belonged to its "jurisdiction in the admi-
ralty.' '2 13 It continued:
Besides, as the 9th section of the judiciary act... gives this court
concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit court of the
United States where an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law
of nations, or a treaty of the United States, I dismiss all doubt upon
this point [of jurisdiction].214
Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the French privateer because a
treaty between the United States and France made neutral property
found on prizes the property of the captor.215 As in Moxon, the court
did not view the Alien Tort Clause as Professor Sweeney does.
Bolchos was a suit in which the privateer claimed rights that depended
on the ship being a lawful prize-not one in which the ship's status as
prize was not in issue.216
Attorney General Bradford's 1795 opinion also contradicts Pro-
fessor Sweeney's restrictive reading3 17 Asked to determine what ac-
tions might be taken against American citizens who had helped the
French plunder Sierra Leone, Bradford replied that the company or
individuals who had been injured could bring a civil suit in federal
court, "jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations,
or a treaty of the United States."218 Yet this incident involved no cap-
ture at sea.219
212. Id. at 810.
213. Id-
214. I&
215. Id. at 811.
216. The same district judge also mentioned the Alien Tort Clause in Jansen v. The
Vrow Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356, 358 (D.SC. 1794) (No. 7216), affd sub nom.
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795), but appears to have relied chiefly on his prize
jurisdiction. See id. at 359.
217. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 93. For further discussion of Bradford's opinion,
see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
218. 1 Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 93, at 59. There is no record that the incident in
Sierra Leone actually led to a suit under the Clause. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over
International Law Claims, supra note 2, at 41 n.185.
219. Professor Casto notes one other early Attorney General's opinion relying on the
statute in connection with the rights of ambassadors. See Casto, supra note 2, at 504 n2C33
(discussing 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 141 (1S04)). The opinion makes no explicit mention of the
statute, but Professor Casto interprets a reference to the ambassador prosecuting "an in-
dictment in district court," 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 141, 147 (1804), as necessarily relbing on the
statute because an ambassador could not prosecute a criminal suit. See Casto, supra note
2, at 504 n.208.
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4. The Word "Only"
I have argued that the best interpretation of the Alien Tort
Clause is one that looks at all the historical evidence and gives proper
weight to the word "all" in the Clause's text. Professor Sweeney's
interpretation might be more plausible if it alone could explain why
Ellsworth put the word "only" after "tort,"2 0 but there are other ex-
planations. Professors Randall and Casto have suggested that the
phrase "tort only" should be read in conjunction with the $500
amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity and alienage juris-
diction as part of an effort to keep suits by British creditors out of
federal court. 2 Despite the promise of Article 4 of the Definitive
Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States "that
Creditors on either Side shall meet with no lawful Impediment to the
Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts
heretofore contracted,"'  and despite the fact that concern about
state courts' hostility toward creditors' claims helped motivate the cre-
ation of federal courts in the first place,13 the First Congress ulti-
mately bowed to political pressure and decided to leave British
creditors to the mercy of state courts.224 According to Randall and
Casto, the word "only" made sure that these creditors could not sneak
into federal court through the Alien Tort Clause.225 It is worth noting
that the broader language of the 1781 resolution, referring to "suits...
for damages by the party injured, ' 2 6 might have opened the door to
contractual as well as tort claims.
Professor Sweeney is not satisfied with this explanation because
he thinks the word "tort" could have done that job just as well by
itself 227 In light of the strong opposition, particularly in the southern
220. It was the word "only" that sent Professor Sweeney on his quest in the first place.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
221. See Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims, supra note 2, at
28-31; Casto supra note 2, at 507-08.
222. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 80, reprinted in 2
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL Acm OF THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA 151,
154 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931).
223. Holt, supra note 104, at 1458; see also supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
224. See Holt, supra note 104, at 1487-88.
225. See Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims, supra note 2, at
28-31; Casto supra note 2, at 507-08.
226. 21 JOURNALS OF THIE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 36, at 1137.
227. Sweeney, supra note 2, at 446 ("The bonding of the word 'only' to the word 'tort'
always struck me as peculiar and intended to do more than merely exclude actions not in
tort. I never could see why granting jurisdiction over a 'tort' should be read as implying a
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States, to permitting British creditors to sue in federal court,'-" Ells-
worth's use of the word "only" seems a reasonable precaution. But
"only" may have been designed to serve an additional purpose as well.
The district court in Moxon v. The Fanni " 9 interpreted the word
"only" as being about remedies.2-' For some kinds of torts, one had a
choice of remedies. As the circuit court explained in Bullard v. Bell,
"[i]f a person unlawfully converts and sells the property of another, it
is properly a tort; yet the injured party may waive the tort, and bring
assumpsit for the proceeds."'231 The word "only" might have served to
limit an alien who wished to bring such a suit in district court to tort
damages. Or, as in Moxon, the word "only" might have limited an
alien to damages and excluded the possibility of obtaining restitution
of the property itself.23 2 These distinctions regarding the available
remedy would not have made much difference in suits to recover the
debts with which Article 4 was concerned, but they might have as-
sumed some importance in light of Articles 5 and 6, which provided
that British Subjects should be free to seek "Restitution" of property
confiscated from them233 and "[t]hat there shall be no future Confisca-
tions made... against any Person or Persons for or by Reason of the
Part, which he or they may have taken in the present War."-3 4 Thus,
the word "only" may be explained not just as a confirmation of "tort"
but as a limitation on the remedy that British Subjects might seek in
confiscation cases. a-
grant of jurisdiction over something other than a tort, thus creating a need to exclude the
possibility.").
228. See Holt, supra note 104, at 1466-78.
229. 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9S95).
230. See supra notes 20S-10 and accompanying text.
231. 4 F. Cas. 624, 639 (C.C.D.N.H. 1817) (No. 2121).
232. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
233. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 5. 8 Stat S0, reprintcd
in 2 Tr-ATms AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL Acrs oF THE- UNrTED STATvs or A'dnisz'A
151, 154 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931). Of course, the Treaty sas "Restitution," and MoWon's
interpretation would specifically have excluded the possibility of restitution under the
Alien Tort Clause, limiting the plaintiff to damages. See supra note 210 and accompanying
text. But perhaps damages in lieu of restitution would have been sufficient to satisfy Arti-
cle 5 of the Treaty.
234. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 6, S Stat. SO, repnrnted
in 2 TRATrEs AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACmS or THE UNrFD STA-TEs oF A'.wEPJCA
151, 155 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931).
235. Professor Slaughter acknowledges the possible connection between the confisca-
tion cases and the wording of the Alien Tort Clause, but finds no historical support for it.
See Burley, supra note 2, at 46S n.36. However, she fails to provide any explanation of the
word "only" that would satisfy Professor Sweeney. See supra note 227 and accompanying
text.
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To explain why Ellsworth wrote "only," Professor Sweeney ig-
nores the word "all" and forces upon "tort" a limited meaning at odds
with its common understanding.36 He reads the Clause in a way that
did not occur to any early interpreter 237 and in a way that makes it
practically redundant.238 And finally, he ignores the overwhelming
evidence that the First Congress had a broad understanding of "torts
in violation of the law of nations" and enacted the Alien Tort Clause
to provide a civil remedy against any who would violate that law.2 39
But none of this is necessary to provide a satisfactory explanation for
the word "only."
IV. Conclusion
One may well decide that Congress' recent endorsement of Filar-
tiga24° renders the "originalist" arguments of Judge Bork and Profes-
sor Sweeney moot. But that is to avoid the more difficult question of
whether Filartiga was correct when it was decided. The purpose of
this Article has been to show that Filartiga's interpretation of the
Alien Tort Clause as a dynamic provision that provides a federal rem-
edy for all torts in violation of the law of nations is more consistent
with its original intent than the interpretations advanced by Judge
Bork and Professor Sweeney. Judge Bork's interpretation is actually
antihistorical, limiting the Clause in ways that the First Congress
would never have dreamed of.24 ' Professor Sweeney's is deceptively
historical, focusing on some parts of the Clause's text and history but
ignoring others.242 In the end, the history of the Alien Tort Clause 243
confirms that the First Congress meant just what it said-"[t]hat the
district courts shall have... cognizance... of all causes where an
alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States." 2 "
236. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 202-19 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 175-201 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 25-110 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 18 and 114.
241. See supra notes 113-51 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 152-219 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 25-110 and accompanying text.
244. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (emphasis added).
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APPENDIX
Continental Congress' Resolution of November 23, 1781
On a report of a committee, consisting of Mr. [Edmund] Ran-
dolph, Mr. [James] Duane, Mr. [John] Witherspoon, appointed to pre-
pare a recommendation to the states to enact laws for punishing
infractions of the laws of nations:
The committee, to whom was referred the motion for a recom-
mendation to the several legislatures to enact punishments against vi-
olators of the law of nations, report:
That the scheme of criminal justice in the several states does not
sufficiently comprehend offenses against the law of nations:
That a prince, to whom it may be hereafter necessary to disavow
any transgression of that law by a citizen of the United States, will
receive such disavowal with reluctance and suspicion, if regular and
adequate punishment shall not have been provided against the
transgressor:
That as instances may occur, in which, for the avoidance of war, it
may be expedient to repair out of the public treasury injuries commit-
ted by individuals, and the property of the innocent be exposed to
reprisal, the author of those injuries should compensate the damage
out of his private fortune.
Resolved, That it be recommended to the legislatures of the sev-
eral states to provide expeditious, exemplary and adequate
punishment:
First. For the violation of safe conducts or passports, expressly
granted under the authority of Congress to the subjects of a foreign
power in time of war:
Secondly. For the commission of acts of hostility against such as
are in amity, league or truce with the United States, or who are within
the same, under a general implied safe conduct:
Thirdly. For the infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and
other public ministers, authorised and received as such by the United
States in Congress assembled, by animadverting on violence offered to
their persons, houses, [carriages and property, under the limitations
allowed by the usages of nations; and on disturbance given to the free
exercise of their religion: by annulling all writs and processes, at any
time sued forth against an ambassador, or other public minister, or
against their goods and chattels, or against their domestic servants,
whereby his person may be arrested: and,
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Fourthly. For infractions of treaties and conventions to which the
United States are a party.
The preceding being only those offences against the law of na-
tions which are most obvious, and public faith and safety requiring
that punishment should be co-extensive with such crimes:
Resolved, That it be farther recommended to the several states to
erect a tribunal in each State, or to vest one already existing with
power to decide on offenses against the law of nations, not contained
in the foregoing enumeration, under convenient restrictions.
Resolved, That it be farther recommended to authorise suits to be
instituted for damages by the party injured, and for compensation to
the United States for damage sustained by them from an injury done
to a foreign power by a citizen.]t
t The editor reports that the resolution is in the writing of Edmund Randolph and
that the part appearing in brackets is in the writing of George Bond. See 21 JOURNALS OV
TH CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 1137 n.1 (Library of Congress, 1912).
